Cumulative process models from Thorton to Wicksell by Thomas M. Humphrey
CUMULATIVE PROCESS MODELS FROM
THORNTON TO WICKSELL
Thomas M. Humphrey
The celebrated Wicksellian theory of the cumu-
lative process is a landmark in the history of mone-
tary thought. It gave economists a dynamic, three-
market (money, credit, goods) macromodel capable
of showing what happens when banks, commercial or
central, hold interest rates too low or too high. With
it one could trace the sequence of events through
which money, interest rates, borrowing, spending,
and prices interact and evolve during inflations or
deflations. The prototype of modern interest-pegging
models of inflation, it influences thinking even
today. It also confirms the adage, well known to
historians of science, that no scientific discovery is
named for its original discoverer [19, p. 147]. For,
as documented below, it was not Knut Wicksell but
rather two British economists writing long before
him in the first third of the nineteenth century who
first presented the theory.
The cumulative process analysis itself attributes
monetary and price level changes to discrepancies
between two interest rates. One, the market or
money rate, is the rate that banks charge on loans.
The other is the natural or equilibrium rate that
equates real saving with investment at full employ-
ment and that also corresponds to the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital. When the loan rate falls below
the natural rate, investors demand more funds from
the banking system than are deposited there by savers.
Assuming banks accommodate these extra loan de-
mands by issuing more notes and creating more de-
mand deposits, a monetary expansion occurs. This
expansion, by underwriting the excess demand for
goods generated by the gap between investment and
saving, leads to a persistent and cumulative rise in
prices for as long as the interest differential lasts.
As stressed by Wicksell, the differential vanishes
once banks raise their loan rates to protect their gold
reserves from depletion by cash drains into hand-to-
hand circulation. Given the volume of real trans-
actions paid in gold coin, these drains arise from the
price increases that necessitate additional coin for
such payments. The differential also vanishes when
a loan rate set  above  the natural rate produces fall-
ing prices and a reversal of the cash drain. In this
case, the resulting excess reserves induce banks to
lower their rates toward equilibrium in an effort to
stimulate borrowing. These adjustments, however,
may occur too late to prevent substantial changes in
prices.
From this analysis it follows that the monetary au-
thority must strive to keep the money rate in line
with the natural rate if it wishes to maintain price
stability. To do this, it must raise or lower its own
lending rate as soon as prices show the slightest
tendency to rise or fall and maintain that rate
steady when prices exhibit no tendency to move in
either direction. By following this rule, it eradicates
the two-rate disparity that generates inflation or de-
flation.
The foregoing model and its policy implications
are well known. Not so well known, however, is that
the model was already more than 70 years old when
Wicksell presented it in his  Interest and Prices  in
1898. Long before then, Henry Thornton (1802,
1811) and Thomas Joplin (1823, 1828, 1832) had
already constructed versions of the model and had
employed it in their policy analysis. The model’s
two-rate, saving-investment, loanable-funds frame-
work was as much their invention as Wicksell’s.
The same is true of their demonstration that inflation
stems from usury ceilings and bankers’ attempts to
peg loan rates at levels other than those that clear
the market for real capital investment. Even
the model’s famous equilibrium conditions-two-
rate equality, saving-investment equality, loan-saving
equality, aggregate demand-supply equality, mone-
tary and price stability-were recognized by them.
All they lacked was an automatic stabilizing mecha-
nism that brings the cumulative process to a halt by
the convergence of the loan rate on the natural rate.
18 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MAY/JUNE 1986And this was provided by Wicksell in the form of
the feedback effect of price changes on the loan rate.
In an attempt to correct some misconceptions about
the theory’s origins and to give these pioneers their
due, the paragraphs below outline the model and its
components to show what the three contributors had
to say about each.
The Model and Its Components
To identify the specific contributions of Wicksell
and his predecessors, it is useful to have some idea
of the model they helped create. As presented here,
that full-employment model consists of seven equa-
tions linking the variables investment I, saving S
(both planned or ex ante magnitudes), loan rate i,
natural rate r, excess aggregate demand E, money-
stock change dM/dt, and price-level change dP/dt.
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Of these, saving and investment are taken to be in-
creasing and decreasing linear functions of the loan
rate, the presumption being that higher rates en-
courage thrift but discourage capital formation.
The first equation states that investment I exceeds
saving S when the loan rate of interest i falls below
its natural equilibrium level r (the level that equili-
brates saving and investment),
where a is a coefficient relating the investment-saving
gap to the rate differential that creates it. The
second equation states that the excess of investment
over saving equals the extra money dM/dt created
to finance it,
That is, assuming banks create money by way of
loan, monetary expansion occurs when they lend
more to investors than they receive in deposit from
savers, To see this, denote the (investment) de-
mand for loans L D as L D = I(i), where I(i) is the
schedule relating desired investment spending to the
loan rate. Similarly, denote loan supply Ls as the
sum of saving S(i)-all of which is assumed to be
deposited with banks-plus new money dM/dt cre-
ated by banks in accommodating loan demands ; in
short, Ls = S(i) + dM/dt. Equating loan demand
and supply (L D = Ls) yields equation (2) above.
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For similar models, see Eagly [2] and Laidler [10,
pp. 104-5, 117].
The model’s third equation says that an excess of
investment over saving at full employment generates
an equivalent excess demand E for goods,
(3) I - S = E,
as aggregate real expenditure outruns real supply.
The fourth equation says that this excess demand
bids up prices, which rise by an amount dP/dt pro-
portionate to the excess demand,
(4) dP/dt = kE.
Substituting equations (1) and (3) into (4), and
equation (1) into (2), yields
(5) dP/dt = ka(r - i) and
(6) dM/dt = a(r - i),
which together state that price inflation and the
money growth that underlies it both stem from the
discrepancy between the natural and loan rates of
interest. This, of course, is the model’s most famous
prediction.
Finally, the seventh equation closes the model by
linking loan rate changes di/dt to price changes
dP/dt. It states that bankers adjust their rates up-
ward in proportion to the price rises so as to protect
their gold reserves from being exhausted by inflation-
induced cash drains into hand-to-hand circulation.
That is, assuming the public makes a certain pro-
portion of its real payments in the form of coin,
rising prices increase the quantity of coin required
for that purpose. To arrest the resulting drain of
coin reserves into hand-to-hand circulation, bankers
raise their loan rates by an amount di/dt pro-
portionate to price changes dP/dt,
(7) di/dt = b dP/dt.
This equation ensures that the loan rate eventually
converges to its natural equilibrium level, as can be
seen by substituting equation (5) into equation (7)
and solving the resulting differential equation for the
time-path of the loan rate.
2 At this point, saving
2 
Solving the differential equation di/dt = bka(r-i) ob-
tained by substituting equation (5) into equation (7)
yields the expression for the time-path of the loan rate i,
i(t) = (i 0-r) e
-bkat + r
where t is time, e is the base of the natural logarithm
system, i 0 is the initial disequilibrium level of the loan
rate, and r is the (constant) natural rate. This expres-
sion states that the loan rate will converge on the natural
rate with the passage of time if the coefficients b, k, and
a are each positive, as is assumed in the model in the text.
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and prices are stable, and bank lending equals saving
-these results obtaining when one sets the two rates
equal to each other in the model. These of course
are the famous Wicksellian conditions of monetary
equilibrium. Given the model and its components,
one can identify what Wicksell and his precursors
contributed to it.
Henry Thornton
The origins of the cumulative process model are to
be found in Chapter 10 of Henry Thornton’s classic
An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper
Credit of Great Britain  (1802) and in the first of
his two parliamentary speeches of 1811 on the Bul-
lion Report. In those works he contributed four
ideas that together constitute the central analytical
core of the model. He also demonstrated the model’s
power as a tool of policy analysis.
3
First, he noted that the quantity of loans demanded
depends upon a comparison of the loan rate of in-
terest with the expected rate of profit on the use of
the borrowed funds. He says, “In order to ascertain
how far the desire of obtaining loans at the bank may
be expected at any time to be carried, we must en-
quire into the subject of the quantum of profit likely
to be derived from borrowing there under the exist-
ing circumstances. This is to be judged of by con-
sidering two points: the amount, first of interest to
be paid on the sum borrowed; and, secondly, of the
mercantile or other gain to be obtained by the em-
ployment of the borrowed capital. . . . We may,
therefore, consider this question as turning principally
on a comparison of the rate of interest taken at the
bank with the current rate of mercantile profit”
[20, pp. 253-4]. He continues : “The borrowers, in
consequence of that artificial state of things which is
produced by the law against usury, obtain their loans
too cheap. That which they obtain too cheap they
demand in too great quantity” [20, p. 255]. Thus
a loan rate equal to the profit rate limits loan de-
mands to noninflationary levels. But a loan rate
below the profit rate induces additional-and infla-
tionary-loan demands.
Second, he explained how the rate differential,
through its effect on loan demands, translates into
money and price level changes. As noted above, the
rate differential induces an expansion of loan de-
mands. Assuming that bankers accommodate these
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On Thornton, see Hayek [4, pp. 12-14; 20, pp. 49-50]
and Schumpeter [18, pp. 720-4].
loan demands by increasing their note issue-an as-
sumption that implies a willingness to let reserve
to note and deposit ratios fall-the money stock ex-
pands. The resulting money-induced rise in aggre-
gate expenditure puts upward pressure on prices. It
also, because of an assumed sluggish adjustment of
wages and other costs to rising prices, stimulates out-
put and employment. Given that the economy nor-
mally operates close to its full-capacity ceiling, how-
ever, the price effect predominates. It follows that
price inflation as well as the money growth that un-
derlies it stems from the differential between the loan
and profit rates as indicated by the expressions
dP/dt = ka(r-i) and dM/dt = a(r-i). Here is
the first model to show that inflation occurs when
bank rates are pegged at inappropriate levels.
Third, he stressed that the rate differential, if main-
tained indefinitely, produces cumulative (continuing)
rather than one-time changes in money and prices.
This is so, he said, because as long as the loan rate
remains below the equilibrium rate, borrowing will
continue to be profitable (“the temptation to borrow
will be the same as before”) even at successively
higher price levels. The result will be more borrow-
ing, more lending, more monetary expansion, still
higher prices and so on without limit in a cumulative
inflationary spiral. Under these conditions, “even
the most liberal extension of bank loans” will fail to
have the slightest “tendency to produce a permanent
diminution of the applications to the bank for dis-
count” [20, p. 256]. On the contrary, loan demands
will be insatiable while the rate differential lasts.
Fourth, from the foregoing considerations Thorn-
ton derived his fundamental equilibrium theorem,
namely that monetary and price level stability obtain
when the loan rate equals the profit rate. Such two-
rate equality, he said, would allow the banking sys-
tem to “sufficiently limit its paper” to noninflationary
levels “by means of the price [i.e., rate] at which it
lends” [20, p. 254]. For with the two rates equal,
their differential would vanish and with it the in-
ducement to borrow and lend that produces infla-
tionary money growth. Money and prices would stop
rising and stabilize at a constant level. Having de-
scribed the two-rate equilibrium, however, he did not
explain what forces would drive banks to attain it.
His model lacked the automatic equilibrating mecha-
nism through which inflation induces banks to raise
their loan rates to equilibrium in order to protect
their reserves from cash drains into hand-to-hand
circulation.
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Thornton’s fifth contribution was his demonstra-
tion of the model’s usefulness as a tool of policy
analysis. He used his model to determine the cause
of the paper pound’s depreciation on the foreign ex-
changes during the Napoleonic wars when Britain
had suspended the convertibility of her currency into
gold at a fixed price upon demand. He attributed
the depreciation to note overissue caused by the Bank
of England’s discount rate being too low. Usury ceil-
ings, he noted, constrained the Bank’s rate to a 5
percent maximum at a time when, owing to the boom
conditions of the war, the expected rate of profit was
well in excess of 5 percent. The result of this dif-
ferential was a loss of Bank control over the volume
of its loans and its note issue, both of which had
expanded to produce inflation. To give the Bank a
firm grip on the money supply, he urged removing
the usury ceiling and requiring the Bank to set its
discount rate equal to the profit rate. As a second-
best alternative, he endorsed the Bank’s policy of
rationing loans. Apart from such direct credit ration-
ing, however, he saw no end to inflation as long as
the differential persisted. In this connection, he
noted that no amount of monetary expansion could
lower the profit rate to the level of the discount rate.
The profit rate, he said, is a real variable determined
by the demand for and supply of real capital. As
such, it is invariant with respect to changes in nom-
inal variables like the money stock. Somewhat in-
consistently, he admitted that money growth could
stimulate capital formation through  forced saving-
the inflation-induced redistribution of purchasing
power from fixed-income receivers to capitalist in-
vestors. But he thought such effects to be quantita-
tively unimportant. For that reason, he made no
mention of the resulting capital accumulation’s im-
pact on the profit rate.
He also employed his model to refute the real bills
doctrine according to which inflationary overissue is
impossible as long as banks lend only on sound com-
mercial paper arising out of real transactions in
goods and services. He contended that the real bills
test provided no check to overissue when the loan rate
is below the profit rate. For the resulting price rise
emanating from the differential would, by raising the
nominal value of real transactions, in&ease the nomi-
nal volume of eligible bills coming forward for dis-
count. Since these bills would pass the real bills
test (i.e., they are backed by an equivalent value of
goods) they would be discounted and the money
stock would expand. This monetary expansion
would validate a further rise in prices thereby re-
sulting in more bills being presented for discount
leading to further monetary expansion and still
higher prices and so on ad infinitum in a never-
ending inflationary spiral. These examples show that
for Thornton the cumulative process model was not
a theoretical toy but a key component of his policy
analysis.
Thornton’s Contemporaries
Thornton’s two-rate analysis was accepted by at
least four of his contemporaries. Thus J. R. Mc-
Culloch, in his refutation of the real bills doctrine,
argued that loan demands depend primarily on “the
rate of interest for which those sums can be obtained,
compared with the ordinary rate of profit that may
be made by their employment” [13, p. 235]. Simi-
larly, Lord King warned that such loan demands
“may be carried to any assignable extent” if the rate
differential persists [9, p. 22]. John Foster put the
point even more forcefully. He said that if the di-
rectors of the Bank of England were to expand the
note issue in an effort to accommodate all loan de-
mands arising at the disequilibrium rate, they “might
at length reduce the value of their notes to that of the
paper on which they are engraved” [3, p. 113]. But
perhaps the clearest and most succinct statement
came from David Ricardo who wrote that “The ap-
plications to the Bank for money, then, depend on the
comparison between the rate of profits that may be
made by the employment of it, and the rate at which
they are willing to lend it. If they charge less than
the market [i.e., natural] rate of interest, there is no
amount of money which they might not lend,-if they
charge more than that rate, none but spendthrifts and
prodigals would be found to borrow of them. We
accordingly find, that when the market rate of in-
terest exceeds the rate of 5 per cent at which the
Bank uniformly lend, the discount office is besieged
with applicants for money; and, on the contrary,
when the market rate is even temporarily under 5 per
cent, the clerks of that office have no employment”
[17, p. 364].
Missing from the analysis of Thornton and his
contemporaries was any mention of the model’s real
saving and investment schedules. These components
were largely overlooked before the appearance of
Thomas Joplin’s  Outlines of a System of Political
Economy (1823), Views on the Currency (1828),
and An Analysis and History of the Currency Ques-
tion (1832).
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Joplin incorporated saving and investment sched-
ules into Thornton’s model and defined the natural
rate as the rate that equilibrates the two.
4 He then
argued that an increase in the demand for capital, by
raising the natural rate above the loan rate, will open
a saving-investment gap and a corresponding excess
demand for goods that bids up prices progressively
as long as the rate differential lasts. He likewise
noted that money growth would accompany and vali-
date the price increases as bankers (who have no
way of knowing what the natural rate is and so
charge their customary rate) honor all credit de-
mands at the going loan rate. These considerations
led him to conclude with Thornton that monetary
and price level changes stem from disparities between
the two rates. He also concluded that monetary
equilibrium and its attendant balance conditions-
saving-investment equality, loan-saving equality, ag-
gregate demand-supply equality, monetary and price
level stability-obtain only when the two rates are
equal.
Joplin’s observations are so Wicksellian that
they must be read to be believed. On the relation
I-S=dM/dt between the investment-saving gap and
the monetary change that finances it, he wrote,
“When the supply of capital exceeds the demand,
it has the effect of compressing it [the circula-
tion]; when the demand is greater than the supply,
it has the effect of expanding it again” [8, p. 101].
On the expression dM/dt=a(r-i) connecting
money-stock changes with the natural rate-loan rate
disparity, he remarked that since bankers “never can
know what the true [natural] rate of interest is”
they “charge a fixed [loan] rate,” with the conse-
quence that the currency “expands and contracts, in-
stead of the interest of money rising and falling”
[8, pp. 109, 111].
Likewise, on the mechanism through which devia-
tions of the loan rate from the natural rate produce
inflation, he observed, “Money comes into the market
. . . from the banks . . . in consequence not of a de-
mand for currency, but of a demand for capital, de-
termined by the interest which the banks charge pro-
portioned to the market [i.e., natural] rate. And in
all cases the influx of money into the market . . . is
not the effect, but the cause of high prices” [6,
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On Joplin, see Corry [1, pp. 54-6, 60-1, 110], Hayek
[4, pp. 15-7], Link [12, pp. 73-102], Schumpeter [18,
p. 723], Viner [22, pp. 190-2], and Warburton [23, pp. 125,
290].
pp. 258-9]. Here is an explicit recognition of (1)
the two-rate disparity, (2) the investment demand
for loans, (3) a loan-determined money stock, and
(4) the money-price relationship-all key ingredients
of Wicksell’s analysis. Finally, on pegging the loan
rate above the natural rate so that saving exceeds in-
vestment and loans, money, and prices all fall, he
said, “If it [fall of prices] proceeded from the interest
charged by the banks, being too high, the economy
[i.e., saving] of the country, instead of reducing the
interest . . .would find vent in discharging the debts
due to the banks, at the high rate of interest they im-
posed; and the value of money and profits of trade
would thus be kept up to that level which rendered
the general economy [saving] greater than the gen-
eral expenditure [investment]” [6, pp. 209-10].
Here is perhaps the first application of the cumula-
tive process model to the deflationary case in which
a loan rate above the natural rate spells an excess of
saving over investment, a deficiency of aggregate de-
mand, a contraction of borrowing and the money
stock, and a consequent fall of prices. In other
words, Joplin recognized that interest-rate pegging
can lead to deflation as well as inflation.
Like Thornton, he saw forced saving as one effect
of the price inflation produced by banks’ willingness
to lend more than the savings voluntarily deposited
with them. “If the issues of the bank are not in-
creased by any loan it makes at interest, an equal
amount of money must have been previously saved
out of income, and paid into the bank, in which case,
the party borrows the income previously saved ; but
if not, and the issues of the bank are increased by
the loan, prices rise, and the party who has borrowed
the money obtains value for it by depriving the hold-
ers of the money in previous circulation, of a pro-
portionate power of purchasing commodities. An
economy is thus created, though a forced economy,
but it answers all the purpose of a volutary one”
[7, p. 146]. He opposed forced saving on the
grounds that it involved a fraud and an injustice on
the preexisting money holders.
From his  analysis he concluded that interest-rate
pegging is an important cause of price-level fluctua-
tions. “One effect, no doubt, would be produced by
the bank regulating its issues by the demand for
[loans] at a particular rate of interest, namely, that
the  rate of  interest  would be kept steady. Instead of
the savings of income rising above four per cent [fol-
lowing, say, an upward shift in the loan demand
schedule], the enlargement of issues would create an
additional quantity sufficient to supply, at four per
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when the savings of income were not in such request,
and the demand at four per cent fell off, the notes of
the bank would be withdrawn, and the supply of such
savings, to a corresponding extent, would be cancel-
led, by which the rate of interest would be kept up
[above its natural level]. The alteration in the
[loan] demand for capital would not affect its value.
The supply of it by means of the enlargement and
contraction of the currency, would be created and
cancelled as it was required. Prices would fluctuate
instead of the interest of money” [7, pp. 152-3].
He contended that these price fluctuations occur
because banks possess the power of creating and de-
stroying paper money at will by varying their reserve
ratios. Take away this power, he said, and banks
would become pure intermediaries, lending only the
savings entrusted to them. In this case, saving would
equal investment, loan rates would equal the natural
rate, excess demand would be zero, and price sta-
bility would prevail. To make these equilibrium con-
ditions a reality he proposed a policy of 100 percent
required gold reserves behind note issues.
To summarize, Joplin gave the model its most
complete formulation up to Knut Wicksell. His in-
clusion of saving and investment schedules allowed
him to show how gaps between the two produced by
deviations from the natural rate translate into money-
stock changes and excess demand that bids up prices.
In short, he recognized all the model’s components
except the price-induced interest-adjustment mecha-
nism that ensures the stability of monetary equi-
librium.
Knut Wicksell
When Wicksell presented his cumulative process
model in 1898, he thought he was the first to do so.
5
At that time he was totally unaware of the earlier
work of Thornton and Joplin. Not until 1916 did he
discover from his colleague David Davidson that
Thornton had foreshadowed him by almost 100 years.
But he apparently never learned about Joplin, whose
saving-investment version of the model was virtually
identical to his.
One finds in his model all the elements developed
by Thornton and Joplin. The two-rate disparity is
there, as are the saving-investment gap, the excess
demand for goods that bids up prices cumulatively,
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fvud [11, pp. 151-61], Patinkin [15, pp. 587-97; 16] and
Uhr [21, pp. 198-254].
and the accompanying money growth resulting from
banks’ willingness to accommodate all credit demands
at the going loan rate. His conclusion-that mone-
tary and price-level changes stem from the two-rate
disparity-is the same as theirs. So too is his list of
monetary equilibrium conditions, including two-rate
equality, saving-investment equality, loan-saving
equality, aggregate demand-supply equality, and
monetary and price-level stability. True, he differed
from Joplin on how these conditions should be
achieved. He preferred a policy of promptly moving
the discount rate in the same direction as prices are
changing, stopping only when price movements
cease. By contrast, Joplin preferred a policy of 100
percent required gold reserves. But both believed
that there existed a workable policy rule to keep
money rates in line with the natural rate. Like his
predecessors, he even used his model as a tool to ex-
plain British price movements in the nineteenth cen-
tury, although he focused on secular rather than
cyclical changes.
He differed from Thornton and Joplin chiefly in
his inclusion of the stabilizing feedback effect of
price-level changes on the loan rate. By adding this
element to the model he was able to show that the
cumulative process is self-limiting provided banks
maintain some desired level of gold reserves and pro-
vided the public transacts a certain proportion of its
real payments in gold coin. Since inflation increases
and deflation decreases the need for coin in circula-
tion to effectuate these given real payments, banks,
he argued, will find their reserves being depleted in
the former case and augmented in the latter. To
arrest these price-induced reserve drains or accumu-
lations they will adjust their rates upward or down-
ward. In this way those price changes bring their
own cessation as the loan rate converges on the na-
tural rate.
He also demonstrated that the cumulative process
is not  self correcting in hypothetical “cashless” or
pure credit economies using no metallic money, all
payments being made by bookkeeping entries, Since
specie drains are not a threat in such economies,
banks need hold no reserves and are free to maintain
indefinitely any money rate they choose. As a result,
there exists no reserve constraint in the cashless so-
ciety to limit the cumulative process. Thus any
spontaneous disturbance that upsets the initial equal-
ity between the two rates will set in motion an in-
flation or deflation that can continue indefinitely.
He further argued that the same may be true even
in pure cash societies if technological innovations,
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to change before the loan rate can ever catch up with
it. In this case, the loan rate’s lag behind the moving
natural rate spells incomplete adjustment, persistent
disequilibrium, and ceaseless price changes.
This last insight, which combined the notions of
an active or leading natural rate and a passive or
trailing loan rate, enabled him to resolve what Keynes
was later to call the Gibson paradox. This paradox,
which neither Thornton nor Joplin addressed, holds
that prices and interest rates historically move to-
gether in the’ same direction when, according to
standard monetary theory, they should move inverse-
ly as excess issues of money temporarily depress in-
terest rates while raising prices. In resolving the
paradox, Wicksell agreed that prices and loan rates
would move inversely if those rates fell below a given
natural rate. For example, if loan rates fell to 4 per-
cent when the natural rate was 5 percent, prices
would rise. On the other hand, prices and loan rates
would tend to move together if the natural rate itself
moves and the loan rate lags behind (i.e., adjusts
incompletely to the changing natural rate). In this
case, loan rates, though rising or falling, would still
be too low or too high relative to the natural rate to
prevent a cumulative rise or fall in prices. Indeed,
this was precisely Wicksell’s explanation of long-
term price changes in nineteenth century Britain.
These changes he saw as emanating from movements
of the active natural rate about the lagging loan rate.
Except for these applications, Wicksell’s use of the
model was the same as Thornton’s and Joplin’s.
Concluding Comments
That Wicksell at best only rediscovered or rein-
vented the model now universally associated with his
name is hardly surprising. It merely confirms the
validity of Stigler’s Law of Eponymy according to
which no scientific discovery is named for its original
discoverer. Still this finding, though completely un-
exceptional, is nevertheless at odds with some recent
interpretations of the model’s history. Certainly it
is not true, as suggested in Axel Leijonhufvud’s re-
cent essay on the “Wicksell Connection,” that the
model derives solely from Wicksell. Nor is it true, as
Leijonhufvud contends, that Wicksell originated the
saving-investment approach to macroeconomics [11,
pp. 132-3]. For, as documented above, the cumula-
tive process model together with its implied con-
ditions of monetary equilibrium originated not with
Wicksell but rather with Thornton and Joplin. Of
these two pioneers, Joplin deserves at least some
credit for initiating the saving-investment approach
since it was he who first introduced saving and in-
vestment schedules into the model.
These findings also cast doubt on Robert Nobay’s
and Harry Johnson’s recent attempt to distinguish
between classical and Wicksellian phases in the evo-
lution of monetary thought [14, pp. 471-3]. The
classicals, according to this distinction, concentrated
on establishing the proposition of the long-run neu-
trality of money. Wicksellians, by contrast, focused
on the dynamic implications of monetary responses
and disturbances as well as on the conditions of
monetary equilibrium. What is overlooked is that
at least two classical monetary theorists, namely
Thornton and Joplin, were Wicksellians as far as
their monetary analysis was concerned. True, they
accepted the neutrality proposition. But their main
concern was investigating the dynamics of money’s
response to deviations of the loan rate from the nat-
ural rate. They also sought to eliminate those de-
viations so that prices could be stabilized. To that
end they spelled out the conditions of monetary
equilibrium and prescribed policies to achieve them.
In these ways they strongly resembled Wicksell.
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